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ILLUMINATING THE CJEU's BLINDSPOT OF INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
Abstract 
The CJEU decided its first ever discrimination claim argued explicitly on two 
grounds – sexual orientation and age – on 24 November 2016. It found that no 
discrimination could exist on both grounds where no discrimination existed on the 
grounds considered separately. With this, the Court rejected the possibility of 
recognising discrimination based on two grounds combined together and thus the 
relevance of intersectionality in EU discrimination law. This note critiques the 
decision in Parris v Trinity College Dublin not only for disregarding intersectional 
discrimination but also for its weak single ground analysis. In particular, the note 
argues that the Court failed: (i) to appreciate the normative basis of 
intersectionality – as creating unique patterns of disadvantage based on a 
combination of grounds – and how it transpires in practice; and (ii) in the 
alternative, to apply the Employment Directive 2000/78 correctly to claims of 
sexual orientation and age discrimination and in light of its discrimination 
jurisprudence. The failure in Parris thus signifies a lost opportunity for the Court to 
address complex forms of structural inequality in EU law.  
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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
EU law’s tryst with intersectionality has been a peculiar one. The surge in the growth of EU 
discrimination law in 2000s coincided with the demands for recognising intersectionality 
understood as disadvantage suffered on more than one ground. Since then, law,1 policy,2 
                                                 
1  See Race Directive 2000/43/EC, recital 14; Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC, recitals 2, 3, 10 and 
arts 4(2), 6(2); Gender Directive (Recast) 2006/54/EC, recitals 3, 11, 23, 24 and arts 6, 8(2), 9(1)(c), 11(a), 13.  
2  See esp reports commissioned by the European Commission: S. Fredman, ‘Intersectional Discrimination in 
EU Gender Equality and Non-discrimination Law’ (2016) at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/document/files/intersectionality.pdf (last accessed 15 February 2017); S. Burri and D. Schiek, 
‘Multiple Discrimination in EU Law Opportunities for Legal Responses to Intersectional Gender 
Discrimination?’ (2009) at  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/multiplediscriminationfinal7september2009_en.pdf (last accessed 15 February 2017); 
‘Tackling Multiple Discrimination Practices, Policies and Laws’ (2007) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=51&type=2&furtherPubs=no (last 
accessed 15 February 2017); and the European Parliament: K. Davaki et al, ‘Discrimination Generated by 
the Intersection of Gender and Disability’ (2013) at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493006/IPOL-
FEMM_ET(2013)493006_EN.pdf (last accessed 15 February 2017).  
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and scholarship3 have progressively acknowledged that grounds like race, sex, religion, 
disability, age and sexual orientation can intersect to produce discrimination. This is 
peculiar because intersectionality’s journey in other jurisdictions especially its birth site – 
USA – started with the repeated failures of test cases argued on multiple grounds.4 In 
response, academics mounted the intersectionality theory and thus began the struggle to 
have it recognised in US discrimination law. Aware of this challenging history, EU 
institutions and academics pre-emptively posited trenchant accounts of how to avoid such 
failures in their own context.5 Given this longstanding effort, it is somewhat surprising that 
the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) first intersectional case decided explicitly 
on the grounds of sexual orientation and age failed to appreciate intersectionality. Instead 
of judicially backing the recognition of intersectionality in discrimination law, the First 
Chamber decision in Parris v Trinity College Dublin6 gave a short shrift to intersectional 
discrimination in EU Law. In this way, Parris signifies a lost opportunity for the Court to 
recognise and redress complex forms of structural inequality in EU Member States.7  
                                                 
3  See seminal contributions from D. Schiek and A. Lawson (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law 
and Intersectionality (Ashgate 2011); D. Schiek and V. Chege (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination 
Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2009); K. 
Monaghan, ‘Multiple and Intersectional Discrimination in EU Law’ (2012) 13 European Anti-discrimination 
Law Review 20; S. Fredman, ‘Double Trouble: Multiple Discrimination and EU Law’ (2005) 2 European Anti-
Discrimination Law Review 13; D. Schiek, ‘Broadening the Scope and the Norms of EU Gender Equality 
Law: Towards a Multidimensional Conception of Equality Law’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 427.  
4  DeGraffenreid v General Motors 413 F Supp 142 (ED Mo 1976); Rogers v American Airlines (1981) 527 F Supp 
229 (SDNY); Payne v Trevanol 673 F 2d 798 (5th Cir 1982); Moore v Hughes 708 F 2d 475 (9th Cir 1983). All 
these cases in the USA were brought by Black women on the grounds of both race and sex discrimination. 
See also other notable failures of intersectional claims in the UK: Bahl v The Law Society [2004] EWCA Civ 
1070 (UK Court of Appeal); and Canada: Mossop v Canada (Attorney General) [1993] 1 SCR 554 (Supreme 
Court of Canada). 
5  See references above nn (2)–(3).  
6  Case C-443/15 Parris v Trinity College Dublin [2017] ICR 313 (CJEU).  
7  Cf Advocate General Sharpston’s opinion in Case C-227/04 P Maria-Luise Lindorfer v Council of the 
European Union [2007] ECR I-6767 (CJEU), which specifically dealt with the discrimination claim on the 
grounds of age and sex both. This remains the only other instance of a discrimination claim to have been 
explicitly discussed on two grounds other than Parris. The CJEU in Lindorfer however did not address the 
question of intersectionality. There are though, cases which have been argued, but neither discussed nor 
decided on multiple grounds by the CJEU. See in particular, Case C-415/10 Galina Meister v Speech Design 
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 This note examines the setback in Parris. It takes a close look at the CJEU’s 
reasoning rejecting the existence of intersectional discrimination based on a combination 
of two grounds when no such discrimination exists on the grounds taken in isolation. Part B 
recapitulates the facts and reasoning of the Parris decision. Part C argues that the CJEU’s 
failure in Parris is first and foremost a normative one in that the Court takes a narrow view 
of discrimination to be based on a single ground at a time and thus fails to appreciate 
patterns of disadvantage created by the combination of grounds. Part D shows that this 
normative failure leads to and is accompanied by a lack of practical engagement with how 
intersectional claims based on multiple grounds transpire. In particular, it highlights the 
complex nature of the claim as based on one ground directly (age) but causing indirect 
discrimination based on two grounds (age and sexual orientation). Part E argues that even 
if the Court were to respond to Parris as a matter of single ground discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and age separately, its analysis under the Employment Directive 2000/78 
fails in appreciating at least two things – (i) the strict or narrow application of exceptions or 
justifications in a way that does not override the equality and non-discrimination guarantee 
per se; and (ii) the importance of carrying out proportionality analysis in discrimination 
claims. Had the Court appreciated these, it could have appreciated intersectional 
discrimination within the individual grounds of sexual orientation and age, by adopting a 
‘capacious’ view of each—an approach familiar to the Court from its previous case law. 
Thus, in the final analysis, the CJEU’s decision undermines the juridical significance of 
intersectionality in EU law, in that Parris exemplifies exactly the kind of discrimination claim 
                                                                                                                                                       
Carrier Systems GmbH [2012] ECR 000 (CJEU) [2], [29]. There are also cases which appear to have multiple 
grounds relevant to them such as age and sex, though they have not been argued, discussed, or decided 
by the CJEU as such. See Case C-43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 45 (CJEU); Case C-152/84 Marshall v 
Southampton Health Authority [1986] ECR 723 (CJEU); Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981 
(CJEU); Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] All ER (EC) 867 (CJEU). 
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which finds it difficult to succeed in the absence of it. But it also shows that in the 
alternative, the CJEU’s single ground analysis too appears unconvincing in light of its own 
doctrine. Part F concludes with this thought.  
 
B. THE DECISION IN PARRIS 
 
David Parris had been in a relationship of over thirty years with his same-sex partner. Their 
relationship was legally recognised in 2011 when Ireland passed the Civil Partnership Act. 
At this point, Mr Parris was 64 year’s old. Under his occupational benefit scheme, Mr Parris’ 
partner would have been barred from receiving a survivor’s pension because they had not 
entered into a civil partnership before he turned 60. But the lack of a national law allowing 
same-sex partners to contract civil partnerships in 2006 – the year Mr Parris turned 60 – had 
made it impossible for them to satisfy this rule. Mr Parris challenged the rule as 
discriminatory on the grounds of sexual orientation and age under the Council Directive 
2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation. The Labour Court (Ireland) referred the dispute to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. It asked three questions: first, whether the impugned rule was discriminatory on the 
ground of sexual orientation contrary to Article 2 of Directive 2000/78; secondly, should the 
answer to the first question be in the negative, if the rule was discriminatory on the ground 
of age contrary to Article 2 of Directive 2000/78; and finally, should the answer to the 
previous question also be in the negative, if the rule was discriminatory on the basis of the 
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‘combined effect’ of age and sexual orientation.8 The CJEU answered all the questions in 
the negative.  
 In regards sexual orientation, the Court first confirmed that the rule did not directly 
discriminate under Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 since it did not explicitly refer to the 
member’s sexual orientation.9 It then proceeded to consider whether the rule was indirectly 
discriminatory under Article 2(2)(b)(i) of Directive 2000/78. But instead of analysing 
whether under the definition of indirect discrimination the rule constituted an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice which put persons having a particular sexual 
orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with others, the Court simply resorted to 
Recital 22 of Directive 2000/78 which provides that the Directive is without prejudice to 
national laws on marital status. The Court found that because Recital 22 put no obligation 
on Ireland to legally recognise civil partnerships or benefits dependant thereon,10 the rule 
did not produce indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.11 
 In regards to age, the Court found that the rule established difference in treatment 
based directly on the criterion of age, but was ultimately justified under Article 6(2) of 
Directive 2000/78. According to Article 6(2), Member States could, notwithstanding Article 
2(2), provide for fixing occupational social security based on age provided that it did not 
result in discrimination on the grounds of sex. The Court held that the impugned rule simply 
fixed an age for entitlement to an old age benefit and hence did not constitute 
discrimination on the ground of age because it was covered by Article 6(2).12  
                                                 
8  Parris (n 6) [29] [79]. 
9  ibid [49] [50]. 
10  ibid [59] [60]. 
11  ibid [61]. 
12  ibid [75] [76]. 
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 Finally, the Court summarily dismissed the third question by stating that 
discrimination could not result from a combination of grounds when no discrimination was 
found on the basis of each of the grounds taken in isolation.13 Thus, when the rule did not 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and age considered independently; it could 
not produce discrimination on the basis of both considered together.14  
 The failure of the claim in Parris is centrally based on the Court’s absence of an 
intersectional perspective. This is visible both in the Court’s denial of the ‘combined’ nature 
of the claim based on the grounds of sexual orientation and age, as well as, its rigid single 
ground analysis which could not account for intersectionality within sexual orientation and 
age taken separately but interpreted capaciously. The next three sections unpack these 
claims.   
 
C. UNDERSTANDING INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
The key failure in Parris was the inability of the Court to see the claim as a matter of 
intersectional discrimination based on both sexual orientation and age at the same time. 
The first conceptual error lies in treating the claim as separate questions of discrimination 
based on, first, sexual orientation; then in the alternative, age; and failing both, the 
combined effect of sexual orientation and age. According to the Court, since neither sexual 
orientation nor age discrimination were established independently, there was no basis for 
finding ‘combined’ discrimination because: 
 
while discrimination may indeed be based on several of the grounds set out in Article 1 of Directive 
2000/78, there is, however, no new category of discrimination resulting from the combination of more 
                                                 
13  ibid [80]. 
14  ibid [81]. 
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than one of those grounds, such as sexual orientation and age, that may be found to exist where 
discrimination on the basis of those grounds taken in isolation has not been established.15 
 
 The reasoning uncannily mirrors the earliest repudiation of intersectionality in 
DeGraffenreid v General Motors.16 In deciding one of the first cases explicitly argued on the 
grounds of race and sex in the US, the District Court of Missouri in DeGraffenreid had 
declared that ‘the lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race 
discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.’17 
Any other interpretation would have meant the creation of a ‘new special sub-category’ or 
‘special class’ for the grant of a ‘new “super-remedy”’ beyond the contours of the non-
discrimination guarantee under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964.18 The DeGraffenreid 
Court thus went on to examine Black women’s claim argued on both the grounds of sex and 
race as—first, a matter of sex discrimination, and then, race discrimination. The claim failed 
on both counts. DeGraffenreid thus became the centre of Kimberlé Crenshaw’s critique 
which gave rise to intersectionality theory in 1989.19 Since then, the US jurisprudence has 
evolved to recognise intersectional claims based on two grounds at most.20 
 Almost three decades later, the CJEU repeats the DeGraffenreid error of reducing a 
claim based on two grounds to two discrete claims, each based on sexual orientation and 
                                                 
15  ibid [80]. 
16  DeGraffenreid (n 4).  
17  ibid 143.  
18  ibid. 
19  K.W. Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 139. See seminal works exploring intersectionality theory, including, P.H. Collins, Black Feminist 
Thought (2nd edn, Routledge 2009); E. Grabham, D. Cooper, J. Krishnadas and D. Herman (eds), 
Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (Routledge Cavendish 2009); P.H. 
Collins and S. Bilge, Intersectionality (Polity Press 2016); A. Hancock, An Intellectual History of 
Intersectionality (OUP 2016); V.M. May, Pursuing Intersectionality: Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries 
(Routledge 2015). 
20  The ‘sex-plus’ and ‘race-plus’ form of intersectionality has been recognised in Jefferies v Harris County 
Community Action Association (1980) 615 F2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir); Judge v Marsh (1986) 649 F Supp 770 (US 
District Court for the District of Columbia); Lam v University of Hawaii (1994) 40 F3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir); 
Coleman v B-G Maintainence Management, Inc (1997) 108 F3d 1199 (10th Cir); Vasquez v County of LA 
(2003) 349 F3d 634 (9th Cir).  
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age. This approach was instated by the referring court in the way it formulated the three 
questions, and was later adopted in Advocate General Kokott’s opinion. Whilst she began 
by pointing out that ‘the Court’s judgment will reflect real life only if it duly analyses the 
combination of those two factors, rather than considering each of the factors of age and 
sexual orientation in isolation’;21  her legal assessment in fact treated ‘the issue of 
discrimination from three different perspectives which are each the subject of a separate 
question.’22 The CJEU followed suit – perhaps constricted by design of a reference 
proceeding and limited by the referring court’s formulation – by examining the claim as 
self-standing issues of discrimination based on each ground first, and as intersectional 
discrimination, only in the alternative. This however was far from what the case was 
actually about.   
 The central issue before the Court was whether a rule in an occupational benefit 
scheme, which limited the payment of survivor’s pension by a requirement that the 
member of the scheme and the surviving partner must have married or entered a civil 
partnership prior to the member’s 60th birthday, be considered discriminatory when the 
national law did not allow the member to marry or to enter a civil partnership with his 
same-sex partner until after he turned 60. Thus, the claim was about discrimination 
specifically against those who were same-sex partners and could not enter into civil 
partnerships before they turned 60 – a group defined both by its sexual orientation and age 
at the same time. The impugned rule potentially affected all gays who turned 60 before 
2011, denying their partners any possibility of claiming under the occupational benefit 
scheme, even when their partnerships were legally recognised since 2011. The rule did not 
                                                 
21  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 30 June 2016 in Parris at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62015CC0443 (last accessed 15 February 2017) [4]. 
22  ibid [30]. 
  9 
discriminate against gays per se since those born after 1951 could enter into civil 
partnerships before they turned 60 and their same-sex partners could then avail survivor’s 
pension. In this way, it could not be seen as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
alone. At the same time, while the rule did discriminate against those who did not marry by 
the time they turned 60, the rule could be considered legitimate as a clampdown on 
deathbed marriages solemnised simply to enable someone to claim a survivor’s pension.23 
Age discrimination, even if it existed, may have appeared justified in this case.24 The claim 
was thus neither about sexual orientation nor age exclusively, but about both of them at 
the same time. It was thus a case of intersectional discrimination at its heart. 
 The tendency to treat intersectional claims as based on each ground separately 
marks, what Crenshaw called, ‘the dominant conception’25 of thinking about discrimination 
along ‘a single categorical axis’.26 This dominant conception inhibits the possibility of 
appreciating discrimination against those belonging to multiple disadvantaged groups. For 
example, Crenshaw argued that the exclusive focus on sex or race protected those 
disadvantaged solely by their sex (white women) and race (Black men) but privileged in 
every other way (in relation to their race, sex, disability, sexual orientation, age, religion, 
etc). This eclipsed the experiences of Black women defined both by their sex and race in 
ways which were similar to and different from white women and Black men. Since Black 
women were both women and Blacks, some of their experiences of sex discrimination 
coincided with those of white women (say, of gender violence) while others coincided with 
experiences of race discrimination suffered by Black men (say, of slavery and segregation). 
                                                 
23  ibid  [72]–[73].   
24  The Court, unlike Advocate General Kokott, did not examine the legitimacy of the provision in this way but 
simply applied the exception to age discrimination contained in Article 6(2) of the Directive. This approach 
is critiqued in Part E below. 
25  Crenshaw (n 19) 150. 
26  ibid 140. 
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But they also suffered some unique forms of discrimination which were not faced by white 
women or Black men at all. Thus, in the case of DeGraffenreid, while both white women and 
Black men were hired and retained by General Motors, it was mainly Black women 
employees who were dismissed under the ‘last hired first fired’ policy since they entered 
employment much after white women and Black men, and hence were first to lose their 
jobs. Their intersectional position was thus characterised by both shared (like of sexism and 
racism), and well as, different experiences (like in DeGraffenreid) based on gender and race 
simultaneously. According to Crenshaw, in seeing discrimination against Black women as 
either similar to or different from discrimination based on the individual grounds of gender 
and race, rather than both of them combined, the dominant conception of single-axis 
discrimination had obliterated intersectionality from discrimination law.27  
 The CJEU falls in this trap. It sees discrimination against Mr Parris and his partner 
defined exclusively as sexual orientation or age discrimination rather than seeing the 
intersectional patterns of disadvantage created by the interaction of grounds. It thus 
ignores the distinct experience of discrimination against older gays who not only suffer 
both homophobia and ageism generally, but also unique disadvantages which result from 
the combination of both—like the disadvantage accruing from the impugned rule which 
excluded them from survivor’s pension. In this way, the Court fails to recognise, what 
Conaghan calls, the ‘qualitatively distinct’28 nature of intersectional discrimination by 
imposing an artificial limitation upon EU law as excluding the ‘combined effect’ of sexual 
orientation and age from the purview of the non-discrimination guarantee. This limitation 
                                                 
27  Crenshaw (n 19) 149. See also S. Cho, K. Crenshaw and L. McCall, ‘Toward a Field of Intersectionality 
Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis’ (2013) 38 Signs 785, 787. 
28  J. Conaghan, ‘Response to the Discrimination Law Review’s Consultation Paper: “A Framework for 
Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain”’ (2007) at https://www.kent.ac.uk/clgs/news-
and-events/news.html (last accessed 15 February 2017). 
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is artificial in that the plain language of Directive 2000/78 does not support it. Article 2 
defining the ‘concept of discrimination’ gives no indication of limiting the remit of anti-
discrimination to only discrete and mutually exclusive forms of discrimination based on a 
single ground alone. For example, Article 2(1) provides that: ‘the principle of “equal 
treatment” shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on 
any of the grounds’. Recital 3 specifically recognises that ‘women are often the victims of 
multiple discrimination’ thus acknowledging the relevance of other grounds in the causal 
equation of discrimination against women. There is no indication in the text of the Directive 
that ‘multiple discrimination’ or discrimination ‘on any of the grounds’ is to be interpreted 
as excluding combined forms of discrimination which cannot be proved individually in 
relation to each ground. In fact, as Dagmar Schiek confirms: ‘we can safely assume that 
international and European organisations use the term ‘multiple discrimination’ as [an] 
overarching notion.’29 So the explicit recognition of multiple discrimination in the recital, 
and the unambiguously broad definitions of direct and indirect discrimination under Article 
2(2), support the case for interpreting these guarantees to include discrimination based on 
multiple grounds including discrimination which is intersectional in nature, i.e. based on the 
combined effects of two or more grounds considered together. Thus, the key to 
appreciating the qualitatively distinct nature of intersectional discrimination associated 
with multiple grounds lies in the possibility of interpreting the provisions recognising 
multiple discrimination to not only quantitatively include multiple grounds, but more 
importantly, also the conceptual idea that these multiple grounds do not necessarily act 
independently, sequentially or additively, but also synergistically.  
                                                 
29  D. Schiek, ‘Executive Summary’ in Burri and Schiek (n 2) [2.1] (‘There is no indication that the term 
‘multiple’ is meant to refer to any specific form of connection between the different strands of 
disadvantage.’).  
  12 
 This has been the central takeaway of EU discrimination scholarship in the last 
decade which has tried to extend the interpretation of non-discrimination provisions to 
include cases of intersectional discrimination. In one of the early accounts of 
intersectionality in EU law, Gay Moon argues that whilst the equality Directives ‘do not 
expressly provide for multiple discrimination, [they] do not exclude it and obliquely 
acknowledge its existence. Both the Race Equality Directive and the Equal Treatment 
Directives recognise that different grounds may intersect.’30 Citing Recital 14 of the Race 
Directive which also recognises that women could be victims of multiple discrimination, 
Gay Moon seems to suggest that the nod towards multiple discrimination may stand in for 
recognising intersectional forms of multiple discrimination, i.e. intersectional 
discrimination. The European Commission’s 2007 Report identifies more such instances: 
In relation to gender the preamble to both the Race and the Employment Equality Directives stipulate 
that ‘in implementing the principle of equal treatment, the Community should, in accordance with 
Article 3(2) of the Treaty, aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and 
women, especially since women are often the victims of multiple discrimination.’31 
 
Recitals 2, 3, and 10 of the Employment Equality Directive also make it clear that the Directive is 
intended to work together with existing provisions in relation to race and gender, because they make 
direct reference to the other grounds. The Directive also contemplates situations where there could be 
an intersection between religion and other rights (Article 4 [2]) and age and gender rights (Article 6 
[2]).32 
 
 Given these enabling provisions, Dagmar Schiek, Sandra Fredman and Karon 
Monaghan have independently argued that a separate provision explicitly recognising 
intersectional discrimination may not be needed in EU law at all.33 Both consider the 
                                                 
30  G. Moon, ‘Multiple Discrimination: Justice for the Whole Person’ (2009) 2 Journal of the European Roma 
Rights Centre 5.  
31  ‘Tackling Multiple Discrimination Practices, Policies and Laws’ (n 2) 19. 
32  ibid 20. 
33  Schiek, ‘Broadening the Scope and the Norms of EU Gender Equality Law’ (n 3) 464-65; Fredman, 
‘Intersectional Discrimination’ (n 2) 12; Monaghan (n 3) 27. See also J. Mulder and D. Schiek, 
‘Intersectionality in EU Law: A Critical Re-appraisal’ in Schiek and Lawson (n 3); R.A. Elman, 
‘Intersectionality, Inequality, and EU Law’ in E. Prügl and M. Thiel (eds), Diversity in the European Union 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2009); A. Phoenix and P. Pattynama, ‘Intersectionality’ (2006) 13 European Journal of 
Women's Studies 187; B. Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (1st edn, 2011) 61-66. Cf M.V. 
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existing framework to be sufficiently accommodating of a broader vision of discrimination 
law which can accommodate intersectional claims. Thus, Ruth Nielsen, Dagmar Schiek, 
Susanne Burri, Sacha Prechal, and Anna Lawson have systematically reviewed the CJEU’s 
output from the standpoint of intersectionality, repeatedly pushing for constant reflection 
and engagement with multiple grounds and their synergistic impact in creating 
intersectional patterns of disadvantage.34 In fact, Sandra Fredman’s 2016 EU Report shows 
that the CJEU jurisprudence has implicitly embraced this idea.35 Diamond Ashiagbor goes a 
step further and has posited a ‘hybrid’ approach combining Directives with alternatives to 
hard law, such as gender mainstreaming and diversity management, for recognising 
intersectional discrimination in EU law.36 Others have explored the vast possibilities in EU 
institutional structures for addressing intersectionality through policy.37 
 Parris was the first real possibility for the Court to break through the confines of a 
limited model of single-axis discrimination, and acknowledge these strides made in EU law 
judicially. It was prompted by Advocate General Kokott to do so while she answered the 
final question on intersectional discrimination where she cited the prolific literature on the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Onufrio, ‘Intersectional Discrimination in the European Legal Systems: Toward a Common Solution?’ 
(2014) 14(2) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 126, 137 (‘Only a change in the EU 
legislation in the direction of a clear prohibition against multiple discrimination and more concrete 
measures for protection against this phenomenon would be the means for securing change at national 
level.’) 
34  D. Schiek, ‘Intersectionality and the Notion of Disability in EU Discrimination Law’ (2016) 53 Common 
Market Law Review 35; R. Nielsen, ‘Is European Union Equality Law Capable of Addressing Multiple and 
Intersectional Discrimination Yet? Precaution against Neglecting Intersectional Cases in European Union 
Non-Discrimination law’ in Schiek and Chege (n 3); S. Burri and S. Prechal, ‘Comparative Approaches to 
Gender Equality and Non-discrimination within Europe’ in Schiek and Chege (n 3); A. Lawson, 
‘Disadvantage at the Intersection of Race and Disability: Key Challenges for EU Non-Discrimination Law’ 
in Schiek and Lawson (n 3).  
35  See Fredman, ‘Intersectional Discrimination in EU Gender Equality and Non-discrimination Law’ (n 3) 71–
79.   
36  D. Ashiagbor, ‘Multiple Discrimination in a Multicultural Europe: Achieving Labour Market Equality 
Through New Governance’ (2008) 61 Current Legal Problems 265. See also M. Verloo, ‘Multiple 
Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union’ (2006) 13 European Journal of Women's Studies 211. 
37  A. Krizsan, H. Skjeie and J. Squires (eds), Institutionalising Intersectionality: The Changing Nature of 
European Equality Regimes (Palgrave Macmillian 2012) and L. Rolandsen Agustin, Gender Equality, 
Intersectionality, and Diversity in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
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subject.38 In failing to take the cue from her opinion, the Court failed in developing the 
transformative potential of EU law to recognise a ‘new category of discrimination’39, but 
more immediately, also misunderstood and defeated a rare but genuine claim of 
intersectional discrimination based on two grounds.  
 
D. RESPONDING TO INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
Claims as in Parris do not just require reimagining discrimination to include intersectional 
forms of disadvantage based on multiple grounds, but also space to be doctrinally 
accommodated within the practice of discrimination law. That is to say, it is not just about 
the normative limitation imposed by the CJEU in Parris by which it splintered the 
intersectional claim into its constituent grounds and failed to appreciate their ‘combined 
effect’, but also about how this misstep fed into the way discrimination was examined—in 
terms of identifying the relevant grounds, classifying the discrimination at play—whether 
direct or indirect, and testing whether such discrimination was actually unlawful.  
 To recall, the claim in Parris was about a rule based on the criterion of age (to marry 
or enter civil partnership before members turns 60), which put those with a particular 
sexual orientation (gays) and with a particular age (those who turned 60 before 2011, i.e. 
born before 1951) at a disadvantage compared with others. It straddles the categories of 
direct and indirect discrimination in a unique way such that even though the rule is directly 
based on the criterion of age it had a particular indirect intersectional impact on gays who 
turned 60 before 2011, on the basis of their sexual orientation and age. This, the Court failed 
to appreciate. In artificially segregating the claim based on sexual orientation and age, the 
                                                 
38  Advocate General Kokott (n 21) [74]–[80].  
39  Parris (n 6) [80]. 
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Court also imposed strict boundaries between the categories of direct and indirect 
discrimination based on each ground. Thus it dismissed the possibility of either direct or 
indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation on account of Recital 22 of the 
Directive, and found direct age discrimination to be justified under Article 6(2) of the 
Directive. None of these categories illuminated the actual disadvantage at play which had 
to do with a criterion based explicitly on a ground (age) but leading to indirect 
intersectional impact based on two grounds (sexual orientation and age). In doing so, the 
Court overlooked its own jurisprudence.   
 This intermediate category which straddles both direct and indirect discrimination 
had been previously recognised by the CJEU in Brachner.40 The case concerned a statutory 
provision which reserved an exceptional increase in pensions to those whose pensions were 
above EUR 746.99 per month. The percentage of women disadvantaged by this provision 
was found to be approximately 2.3 times higher than the percentage of men.41 The Court 
concluded that the category of retired persons suffering disadvantage consisted of a 
significantly greater number of women than men. In this way, the Court found for indirect 
sex discrimination against the intersectional group of older women. The Court was no 
doubt assisted in this by the specific language of Article 4(1) of the Directive 79/7 which 
states that: ‘The principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no discrimination 
whatsoever on ground of sex either directly, or indirectly by reference in particular to 
marital or family status’. The Directive is clear as to the prohibition of sex discrimination not 
only directly based on the grounds of sex but also indirectly affecting women on other 
grounds as well (like age), including marital or family status.  
                                                 
40  Case C-123/10 Brachner v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt [2011] ECR I-000 (CJEU). 
41  ibid [29]. 
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 As Sandra Fredman argues, Brachner takes a ‘capacious’ view of a single ground of 
discrimination in order to address intersectionality within the existing contours of EU 
discrimination law.42 Such a view – which helps a court appreciate the complexity of 
disadvantage associated with a single ground by considering how it interacts with other 
grounds – may also, in the final analysis, embrace intersectionality from within the 
individual grounds. This point is explored further in the next Section. But Brachner also 
shows that it is not necessarily a capacious or an intersectional approach which is alone 
sufficient in responding to intersectionality, but a doctrinal appreciation of the fluidity 
between direct and indirect discrimination based on multiple grounds in intersectional 
claims. In that sense, it may not have been sufficient for the Parris Court to accept that the 
claim was based on both sexual orientation and age, if in turn it exclusively looked for direct 
discrimination or indirect discrimination based on both. The impugned rule in Parris was 
neither based directly on both the grounds nor was it based on a neutral criterion and 
causing indirect discrimination on both. The criterion was actually directly based on age 
while leading to indirect intersectional discrimination based on sexual orientation and age. 
Such structural inequality, which was earlier acknowledged in Brachner, slipped through the 
cracks of both direct and indirect discrimination in Parris.  
 Since the CJEU disagreed with the conceptual framing of intersectional 
discrimination as based on two grounds combined, it could not doctrinally appreciate the 
complex character of discrimination as based directly on one ground (age) but causing 
indirect intersectional impact on that ground (age) combined with another (sexual 
orientation). Consequently, it could not appreciate the actual harm involved in the claim. 
What was the ‘less favourable’ treatment or ‘particular disadvantage’ being challenged by 
                                                 
42  Fredman, ‘Intersectional Discrimination in EU Gender Equality and Non-discrimination Law’ (n 3) 72.  
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the claimant? Was it about the redistributive impact of exclusion from benefits or 
entitlements? Or, as the CJEU has recognised, about ‘stereotypes and prejudices’43 and 
other ‘humiliating and demoralising impact’44 based on grounds? The discrimination in 
Parris perhaps embodied both these dimensions. Besides the obvious redistributive impact 
of being disentitled to survivor’s pension, the exclusion also signified the loss of dignity and 
equal moral worth of older gay couples. It marked the continuing effects of their historical 
marginalisation from social institutions like marriage and civil partnerships as well as from 
employment and related benefits. Although gay and aged persons generally suffered the 
effects of homophobia and ageism, the impugned rule did not impact younger gays (born 
after 1951) and other older heterosexuals – both of whom were free to marry or contract 
civil partnerships and claim the attendant benefits. Causally speaking, the impugned rule 
impacted only and particularly older same-sex couples in that in addition to the general 
homophobia and ageism they also suffered unique redistributive and recognition harms. 
None of these harms were recognised in Parris.  
 The real casualty lies herein. That discrimination in this case failed to be revealed as 
such. This is primarily a diagnostic loss where the Court misses whether and on what basis 
does discrimination occur at all. In case of intersectional discrimination this can only be 
appreciated if one is open to considering that discrimination can be based on the ‘combined 
effect’ of multiple grounds in fact. Thus, ultimately the normative thrust of intersectionality 
is connected to the doctrinal purpose of discrimination law. Intersectionality transforms the 
way discrimination is understood conceptually and also the way in which it is doctrinally 
                                                 
43  Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [2015] ECR I-0000 
(CJEU) [82]. 
44  Case C-54/07 Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008] ECR I-
5187 (CJEU) [15].  
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established in terms of identifying relevant grounds, delineating direct and indirect 
discrimination, and appreciating the actual harm accrued in discrimination claims.  
 
E. ESTABLISHING SINGLE GROUND DISCRIMINATION IN PARRIS 
 
Following the referring Court’s design, the Court in Parris considered the claim first, as a 
matter of indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation; and then failing the ground of 
sexual orientation, as a matter of direct age discrimination. Eventually neither of these 
characterisations succeeded in revealing the disadvantage complained of by the claimant. 
It is useful to see, even if in the alternative, why the Court’s single ground analysis of sexual 
orientation and age also fails to convince as a matter of EU law. 
 With respect to indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Court simply 
cited Recital 22 as justifying such discrimination. Recital 22 provides that: ‘This Directive is 
without prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits dependent thereon.’ It 
concluded that the Recital did not oblige Ireland to provide for civil partnerships for same-
sex couples and thus consequently could not require Ireland to give ‘retrospective effect’ to 
the Civil Partnership Act to allow same-sex partners to claim benefits arising therefrom.45 
Two problems appear with the way the Court applied Recital 22. First, the Court simply 
misconstrues the claim as asking for ‘retrospective’ benefits to be claimed by the 
recognition of same-sex civil partnership. As Advocate General Kokott reminded in her 
opinion, Mr Parris and his partner were only prospectively claiming benefits based on their 
now legally recognised civil partnership. They were, in her words, ‘simply defending 
themselves against a term contained in the occupational pension scheme at issue — the 60-
                                                 
45   Parris (n 6) [60]. 
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year age limit — which was laid down in the past but discriminates against them today.’46 
The Court in Maruko and Romer had previously recognised such a claim by extending 
benefits to same-sex couples which originated before the same-sex partnerships were 
legally recognised.47 The situation in Parris does not seem materially different but the Court 
fails to distinguish between, or to even engage with its own jurisprudence in Maruko and 
Romer. Secondly, the Court misapplied the exception in that it completely let it override the 
prohibition of discrimination under Articles 1 and 2 of the Directive 2000/78. This is a U-turn 
from the Grand Chamber decision in Maruko where it had specifically considered the 
question whether the content of Recital 22 of the preamble could restrict the scope of the 
Directive 2000/78. The Court had answered the question thus:  
 
Admittedly, civil status and the benefits flowing therefrom are matters which fall within the 
competence of the Member States and Community law does not detract from that competence. 
However, it must be recalled that in the exercise of that competence the Member States must comply 
with Community law and, in particular, with the provisions relating to the principle of non-
discrimination.48  
 
 The Court in Parris neither followed its own opinion in Maruko nor did it consider the 
question of application of Recital 22 independently. While it did cite Maruko’s answer to the 
question, it simply went on to find that the Recital carried decisive force without more. 
With this, Parris set a reverse trend in EU law for a perambulatory exception to have greater 
force than the non-discrimination guarantee and the binding content of an equality 
Directive.  
                                                 
46  Advocate General Kokott (n 21) [104]. 
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See analyses of these cases in R. Wintemute, ‘Does EU Law Permit Unequal Survivor’s Pensions for Same-
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 What is even more extraordinary is that the Court does not at any point apply the 
proportionality analysis to assess the legality of the impugned rule. The mere availability of 
exceptions justified discrimination per se. Thus, in the case of direct age discrimination, the 
Court justified the rule in light of Article 6(2) of the Directive 2000/78 which states that:  
 
Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that the fixing for occupational social 
security schemes of ages for admission or entitlement to retirement or invalidity benefits, including the 
fixing under those schemes of different ages for employees or groups or categories of employees, and 
the use, in the context of such schemes, of age criteria in actuarial calculations, does not constitute 
discrimination on the grounds of age, provided this does not result in discrimination on the grounds of 
sex.  
 
 Based on this, the Court simply concluded that: ‘the pension scheme fixes an age for 
entitlement to an old age benefit, and that, consequently, the rule is covered by Article 6(2) 
of the Directive 2000/78.’49 Article 6(2) is indeed an exception to discrimination under 
Article 2(2) but there are two problems with the way the Court applied the exception. First, 
the Court does not consider the full import of Article 6 titled ‘justification of differences of 
treatment on grounds of age’, especially Article 6(1) which provides that Member States 
could justify age discrimination in employment if it is ‘objectively and reasonably justified 
by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational 
training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.’ 
Does Article 6(2) operate uninhibited of the proportionality requirement in Article 6(1)? 
According to the Parris approach, the answer appears to be in the affirmative. This though 
is an odd result given that proportionality is not simply a condition for discrimination to be 
sustained but is also recognised as a general principle of EU law.50 The opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott had thus engaged with the proportionality analysis at length for both sexual 
                                                 
49  Parris (n 6) [75]. 
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orientation and age discrimination.51 The lack of any proportionality analysis in adjudging 
the validity of an exception goes beyond the established contours of not just discrimination 
law but EU law in general.52 It is also inconsistent with Recital 25 which indicates that 
although age discrimination may be justified under certain circumstances and specific 
provisions made by the Member States, it remains ‘essential to distinguish between 
differences in treatment which are justified…and discrimination which must be prohibited.’ 
The Court did not consider whether the impugned rule was actually one to be justifiably 
covered within Article 6(2), but simply found it lawful because it potentially could be 
justified under the Directive. It thus bypassed any consideration of a narrower rule which 
excluded same-sex couples who had reached the age of 60 before 2011.53 Instead, the Court 
delimited the scope of anti-discrimination in Article 2(2) by allowing an exception such as in 
Article 6(2) to operate unencumbered of considerations of proportionality. Given that an 
exception must be construed narrowly or at least narrower than the main provision to 
which it is an exception, the Court’s reading of Article 6(2) appears suspect.54   
 Secondly, and as a consequence of such a reading, the Court failed to reverse the 
burden of proof per Article 10 of Directive 2000/78. According to Article 10, while it is for 
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the claimant to establish ‘facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct 
or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no 
breach of the principle of equal treatment.’ Thus, the burden to prove that discrimination 
was justified per Article 6(2) should have been on the respondent. This is also 
acknowledged in Recital 31 which provides that: ‘The rules on the burden of proof must be 
adapted when there is a prima facie case of discrimination and, for the principle of equal 
treatment to be applied effectively, the burden of proof must shift back to the respondent 
when evidence of such discrimination is brought.’ This burden was neither shifted back to 
nor discharged by the respondent, when the Court applied Article 6(2) as ‘remov[ing] 
occupational pensions from the reach of the directive’s provisions on age discrimination.’55 
In other words, the mere citation of Article 6(2) sufficed in negating the alleged 
discrimination under Article 2(2). Such a reading of Article 6(2) as completely overriding the 
principles of proportionality and equality (other than sex discrimination), appears to be 
against EU discrimination law which accepts both proportionality and equality as its 
cornerstones, accepted conventions of interpretations where exceptions or justification 
defences are to be read narrowly, and ultimately, rules of burden of proof which require 
exceptions or justifications to be proven rather than stated in order to succeed. 
 Ultimately the result was the same as in the case of Recital 22, in that the Court 
applied Article 6(2) as completely overriding anything contained in the Directive. Thus, any 
use of age – even when combined with other grounds like sexual orientation – was per se 
justified in the context of occupational social security schemes. This seems 
counterintuitive. The language of Article 6(2) does not indicate that Members States are 
free to choose a criteria of age combined with any other grounds. In fact, it explicitly 
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recognises that age and sex cannot be combined together to limit membership or 
entitlement to occupational social security schemes. Could the absence of an exclusion of 
combinations of age with other grounds like disability, religion, and sexual orientation from 
Article 6(2) indicate an acceptance of discrimination against older disabled persons, young 
Muslim men, or older gays like Mr Parris? This was the question the Court circumvented. In 
seeing the criterion as simply one based on age (direct discrimination) rather than one 
based on sexual orientation and age (indirect discrimination) in relation to those gay men 
and women born after 1951, it applied Article 6(2) without stopping to consider whether 
Article 6(2) could apply to a case like Mr Parris’ at all.  
 What would have been the result had the Court applied exceptions and 
proportionality properly to its single ground analysis of sexual orientation and age? I would 
argue that the Court would have been able to appreciate intersectional discrimination in 
that case. The Court’s jurisprudence indicates that a properly conducted and broadly 
construed single ground analysis may be capable of appreciating intersectional 
disadvantage for the purposes of establishing discrimination. As indicated above, Brachner 
is the paradigmatic case of this capacious approach ‘to interpreting some of the existing 
grounds when cases [are] brought by claimants who experience specific disadvantage 
because of the confluence of different identities.’56 Thus in Brachner, the CJEU found sex 
discrimination against an intersectional group of older women because the differential rule 
in the pension scheme substantially and specifically disadvantaged older women 
pensioners in comparison with older male pensioners. The Court thus accounted for age 
within the ground of sex to appreciate the intersectional disadvantage suffered in particular 
by a group (older women) defined by two grounds—age and sex. Such an intersectional 
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analysis conducted within a capacious view of a single ground appears common in the 
Court’s sex discrimination case law especially in relation to claims concerning women’s 
age.57 For example, in another instance of a case specifically advanced on multiple grounds 
of sex and age, the Court did not follow the intersectional route suggested by the claimant 
and even rejected the claim of age discrimination; but instead went about finding for sex 
discrimination anyway.58 It did so by interpreting sex discrimination as prohibiting not just 
differential pension benefits based on sex alone, but also other factors like age associated 
with sex, unless they were objectively justified. The Court thus not only accounted for 
multiple grounds within a single ground but also interpreted them intersectionally—by 
appreciating the impact of the impugned provision on a specific intersectional group of 
older women for whom patterns of ageism and sexism combined to result into a significant 
redistributive disadvantage of obtaining lower pension over a length of time.   
 This discussion makes clear that the critical bite of intersectionality does not reside 
in the multiplicity of grounds as much as it resides in forms of analyses which construe 
different patterns of disadvantages as occurring simultaneously. The CJEU’s own 
jurisprudence indicates this form of intersectional analysis developed in relation to a 
capacious view of individual grounds. The benefit of the capacious view is that it allows the 
disadvantage accrued by claimant whose position is defined by multiple and intersecting 
grounds to be appreciated, where a narrow and rigid view of each ground considered in 
isolation would not reveal such disadvantage. In Parris, while neither sexual orientation nor 
age discrimination could be established taken separately, a capacious single-ground 
analysis based on either, which interpreted the exceptions narrowly, and followed 
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principles of burden of proof and proportionality, could have also allowed the intersectional 
claim to succeed.  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
 
Parris was a straightforward case of intersectional discrimination. It posed none of the 
typical problems imagined to be in the way of recognising intersectional discrimination in 
EU law. It was based on two grounds – sexual orientation and age – explicitly enumerated in 
a single equality Directive of 2000/78. It required no complicated manoeuvring for the Court 
to interpret across multiple equality Directives differing in their material scope. The Court 
did not need to identify any analogous grounds of discrimination or look for disguised 
comparators to establish discrimination. All the Court needed in order to appreciate the 
claim was to see the patterns of disadvantage created by sexual orientation and age 
together. The artificial limitation on discrimination as excluding combined forms of 
discrimination based on multiple grounds cost the Court the qualitative appreciation of 
intersectional discrimination and the actual disadvantage suffered by the claimant. But as 
the note agued, even a capacious view of single ground discrimination per Brachner, would 
have allowed the Parris claim to succeed. This would have been in line with the CJEU’s 
distinctive way of addressing intersectionality from within—using its single ground 
approach and traditional tools in discrimination law like proportionality and burden of proof 
to address complex forms of disadvantage. So ultimately, Mr Parris’ situation could have 
been addressed either by pursuing the intersectional route for the first time, or by 
undertaking a capacious single ground analysis of sexual orientation and age 
discrimination. In doing neither, the CJEU in Parris fails not only to recognise intersectional 
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discrimination explicitly, but also in actually addressing it within its traditional but 
progressive single ground framework.  
